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It has been argued that there is a tension between the semantic 
characterization of neural computation and the causal account of 
computation (Shagrir 2010). Just because the heuristic role of semantic 
entities in cognitive science is difficult to deny (Bechtel 2016), it might 
be thought that that the causal account is descriptively inadequate for 
our current scientific practices. Moreover, others have claimed that there 
is a role for content-involving computation (Rescorla 2013) in 
computational explanations. If there is, it means that the mechanistic 
account of computational explanations misses an essential aspect of the 
scientific practice. 
However, I will argue that semantic computation and the causal 
account of neural computation are not mutually exclusive, and they both 
have important explanatory, descriptive, and heuristic roles. One does 
not have to decide to embrace the mechanistic account on pain of 
rejecting all semantic considerations; this is a false dichotomy. In 
particular, semantic notions usually require rich interactions with the 
environment and appropriate internal orchestration of the mechanism; 
purely computational modeling is usually limited to the internal 
functioning of a mechanism, while there are complex inter-level and 
intra-level relationships between computational, semantic, and, more 
broadly speaking, causal posits in explanatory models in neuroscience. 
In this paper, I will show how semantic factors constrain the 
understanding of the phenomena to be explained so that they naturally 
help build better mechanistic models. In section 1, I will elucidate why 
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one could think that there is a tension between mechanistic accounts of 
physical computation and semantic computation in general. Next, in 
Section 2, it will be argued that understanding of what cognitive systems 
may refer to is important in building better models of their cognitive 
processes by specifying the function of cognitive mechanisms partially in 
content-involving ways. For this purpose, a recent study of some 
phenomena in rats that are capable of ‘entertaining’ future paths (Pfeiffer 
and Foster 2013) will be analyzed in Section 3. The researchers stress 
that the hippocampus ‘generates brief sequences encoding spatial 
trajectories’, which is a clearly semantic way of framing the 
phenomenon. The above case shows that computational modeling is not 
just about ‘turning inside’. It requires looking up, down, and around 
(Bechtel 2009). Looking around requires one to understand the 
environmental structure. In short, computation and representation, 
considered in an externalist fashion, do not screen off each other. Why 
should they? Representing requires physical information, and functional 
physical information processing amounts to physical computing. 
1. The tension between causal realization and semantic 
computation 
The purpose of mechanistic accounts of physical computation is to 
deliver a normatively and descriptively adequate list of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that physical systems must satisfy to qualify as 
computers. There are some differences between these accounts 
(Miłkowski 2013; Piccinini 2015), yet they may be summarized jointly in 
the following way. The necessary condition for candidate physical 
systems is that they be mechanisms (in the sense of the new mechanistic 
philosophy, cf. (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel 2008; 
Craver 2007)) whose function is to compute. The mechanism’s causal 
structure should correspond strictly to a mathematical model of 
computation over physical vehicles specified in a substrate-neutral way. 
Moreover, the computational explanation should essentially involve 
processing of information (as Miłkowski states the condition) or be 
usable as information (as Piccinini has framed it). The rest of conditions 
spelled out by Miłkowski and Piccinini simply follow from the general 
methodological norms of mechanistic explanation. 
One striking feature of the mechanistic account is that it does not 
require vehicles of computation to be semantic in any rich sense. In other 
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words, mechanists explicitly reject the claim that only physical systems 
whose parts are semantic can be computers (Piccinini 2008; cf. Fresco 
2010). They assume that there may be computers that operate on 
symbols without any denotation or intrinsic meaning. But this is not 
because they share the conviction that semantic notions are disposable 
altogether. Rather, they think that semantic notions are more difficult to 
specify than the conditions of physical computation. David Chalmers has 
long argued in the same vein: 
If we build semantic considerations into the conditions for 
implementation, any role that computation can play in providing a 
foundation for AI and cognitive science will be endangered, as the 
notion of semantic content is so ill-understood that it desperately 
needs a foundation itself (Chalmers 2011, 336). 
As such, mechanistic and causal accounts refrain from semantic 
considerations. For this reason, however, they can be criticized. First of 
all, there is an important role of cognitive representations in cognitive 
explanations. For example, the whole history of research on the cognitive 
maps in rats was based on a strong assumption that they refer in various 
ways to their environment, and it has resulted in a very promising 
research program (Bechtel 2016). But this role seems to be irrelevant to 
the mechanistic account. 
Second, it has been argued that mechanists cast their net too wide 
which results in limited pancomputationalism: they would have to admit, 
as Chalmers does, that a rock implements a trivial computation – or even 
worse, a class of trivial computations specified as any constant function. 
Namely, the rock’s position may be considered to encode the result of the 
computation. Of course, the rock does not implement all possible 
computational functions, but still a lot of them (Shagrir 2006, 398, 2010, 
272). But Miłkowski (2013, 79), for example, denies that a rock is a 
computer: a computational explanation of the rock’s behavior is not any 
more predictive nor has any more explanatory power than a physical one 
in terms of gravity, which explains why the rock does not fly away etc. 
Furthermore, the rock’s function is not to compute; no parts of the rock 
were selected according to any design as types to perform the constant 
functions (Miłkowski 2013, 62). Piccinini also requires that the result of 
the computation be usable: “the important point is that we are interested 
in computation because of what we (finite observers) can learn from it” 
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(Piccinini 2015, 256). So, while it could still be argued that the semantic 
constraints do not restrict the class of the candidate physical computers, 
other constraints allow mechanists to avoid the charge of drawing the 
boundary between computational and non-computational systems in a 
wrong way. 
A third objection is much more difficult to handle prima facie (cf. 
Shagrir 2006, 409; the example has been simplified). Imagine two 
electrical circuits, CIRC1 and CIRC2. The first responds with voltage v2 
whenever it receives v2 and v2 on its input, otherwise it responds with v1; 
whereas the second responds with v1 whenever it receives voltage v1 and 
v1 on input, and otherwise with v2. Which one of these is the OR gate that 
corresponds to inclusive disjunction, and which is the AND gate, the 
device for computing conjunction? If we treat v1 as true, and v2 as false, 
then CIRC1 is an OR gate, and CIRC2 implements an AND gate. But we 
might switch the logical interpretation, and then CIRC1 is an AND gate, 
and CIRC2 an OR gate. In other words, it seems that there are two 
empirically adequate but inconsistent mechanistic explanations of CIRC1 
and CIRC2. This would mean that the mechanistic account is deficient 
and clearly worse than the semantic account. The semantic account, after 
all, can constrain the interpretation of voltages by taking into account the 
use of the circuit in its environment and possibly in a larger 
computational context. 
Note, however, that if we have no further information about how 
the circuit is used, the semantic account fares no better. There is no fact 
of the matter that could restrict possible interpretations. So what kind of 
information could restrict explanations in this case? For example, there 
could be also one-input circuits that respond with v2 to v1, and vice versa. 
These are probably NOT gates, but we still have no way to say how to 
assign truth and false to voltages. But there are frequent combinations of 
NOT gates and CIRC1 gates. As this combination in a disjunctive normal 
form for propositional calculus corresponds to a material implication 
realized as NOT + OR, we could settle for the interpretation of v1 as true, 
and v2 as false. This is a purely syntactic hypothesis. We could also see 
that a device responds to two input data (for example, from its receptor 
devices) by using CIRC2 gate, and then v2 triggers some response. A 
semantic hypothesis could be that these inputs need to be both present 
for the whole system to respond; so the system uses a conjunction of two 
receptor values. This is again a semantic hypothesis, which seems to 
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confirm the first one. But it’s definitely not sufficient in itself, as it does 
not allow us to reject the hypothesis that the receptors are actually silent 
and that what one sees is the false disjunction. In short, it takes a lot of 
experimentation and careful consideration to decide such issues (and it 
may be impossible to decide which logical connectives are at play as 
based merely on stimuli and responses also in the human case, cf. (Berger 
1980)). It does not seem, therefore, that one account fares better than 
another in this case; the case is indeed difficult. However, it may motivate 
the claim that the mechanistic account should not restrict itself to purely 
formal considerations. How the mechanism responds to the environment 
may be essential for explaining it. 
The difficult case above is similar to the one sketched in the 
argument put forward by Michael Rescorla (2013, 686). While Rescorla 
does not endorse the semantic view on computation, he claims that there 
are content-involving instructions in computer programs. This claim is 
defended against all structuralist accounts of physical computation, not 
only against the mechanistic view. Content-involving instructions 
depend in their causal efficacy on the wide social context of the use of 
computers; an example of this may be the dependence of the numerical 
notation of numbers in a programming language Scheme. It is executed 
on two machines in two different societies: one uses base-10 notation, 
and another base-13 notation, so the program to compute the greatest 
common divisor of 115 and 20:  
(gcd 115 20) 
correctly yields ‘5’ in the base-10 society, but incorrectly in the base-13 
society because ‘5’ “is not a divisor of the base-13 denotation of ‘20’ 
(namely, the number twenty-six)” (Rescorla 2013, 688). 
However, the example does not fully prove the point. The problem 
is that the type of numerical notation is explicitly defined syntactically in 
Scheme. Specifically, it is defined in Backus-Naur Form (BNF), which is a 
syntactical tool used (usually with numerous extensions) to define 
programming languages. The format numbers is defined in the section 
4.2.8, which is a part of Chapter 4 “Lexical syntax and datum syntax” of 
the official language specification (Flatt et al. 2009). Here are the 
definitions of decimal digits and hexadecimal digits: 
<digit> → 0 ∣ 1 ∣ 2 ∣ 3 ∣ 4 ∣ 5 ∣ 6 ∣ 7 ∣ 8 ∣ 9 
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<hex digit> → <digit> ∣ a ∣ A ∣ b ∣ B ∣ c ∣ C ∣ d ∣ D ∣ e ∣ E ∣ f ∣ F 
It would be difficult to encode base-13 using <digit> as defined above, as 
one would not be able to write out A, B, or C in 13-base notation (which 
correspond to 10, 11, and or 12 in the decimal notation). There are 
missing symbols, at least according to standard encoding conventions 
used in programming (note: one could have a non-standard notation that 
would treat one of the digits as special, and not use a simplistic positional 
encoding). In other words, while the base-13 society wrongly thinks that 
Scheme assumes the base-13 notation, it makes no difference as to what 
program is physically implemented. If there are any facts about 
programming languages such as Scheme, the base-13 society got them 
wrong. 
To see that they could be shown to be wrong, it is useful to remind 
how language compilers or interpreters are evaluated. A series of tests, 
called regression tests, are devised in a given programming language. The 
execution of such tests triggers a number of assertions embedded in the 
test. For example, one can assert that (gcd 115 20) yields ‘5’. A failure of 
the assertion means that the compiler does not conform to the language 
specification. 
Similarly, the fact that a user thinks that Microsoft PowerPoint is 
a word processing program it does not make PowerPoint a word 
processing program. The user is simply wrong. Of course, it might be 
objected that if a society had used PowerPoint for its word-processing 
needs, PowerPoint would become a word-processing application. In 
other words, the intention of the software application developers may 
not determine the function of the application, just like the intentions of 
designers of technological artifacts do not fully determine their functions 
(amulets do not really have their functions). While the issue of technical 
functions of artifacts is vexed, the general consensus is that one of the 
determining factors of technical function is also the users’ intention, 
rather than the designer intention (see, e.g. Vermaas and Houkes 2006). 
While the simple numerical notation example introduced by 
Rescorla does not satisfactorily show that the mechanistic approach is 
deficient, there is a deeper point there. The point can be easily proven by 
adapting the example and using some notation that would use, say 8-
base, as there would be no symbols missing for the BNF specification 
(Rescorla, personal communication). In such a situation, it would be 
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impossible to determine the interpretation of ‘100’: one society would 
understand it to stand for decimal 64, and another for decimal 100. And 
there is, potentially, an infinite number of similar ambiguities inherent in 
programming languages. 
To sum up, the function of mechanisms may depend on their 
social and widespread use, and the use may involve semantic factors. 
People frequently use computers to manipulate their external 
representations. Indeed, the rest of the paper will argue that the proper 
focus on the function of mechanisms shows that semantic considerations 
may play a serious role in computational explanations considered 
mechanistically. Mechanistic explanation should, at least for an 
important class of computational mechanisms, include semantic 
considerations. 
2. Building mechanistic models by including semantic constraints 
In this section, the notion of function used in mechanistic accounts of 
computation will be made more explicit. Then it will be shown that some 
but not all computational mechanisms have semantic functions (in a 
sense to be elucidated below). These functions will be only partially 
explained computationally. However, they will constrain the space of 
plausible computational mechanisms posited in mechanistic 
explanations. 
Mechanistic accounts of physical computation focus 
predominantly on functional mechanisms (cf. Garson 2013). However, 
there is a debate over the notion of function appropriate for mechanistic 
explanations. Most defenders of mechanistic explanations rely on a fairly 
weak account that equates function with a capacity of a given physical 
system — its capacity to perform some causal role owning to its internal 
organization (Cummins 1975)— that is of epistemic interest (cf. Craver 
2013, 2001). While it is a fact of the matter whether the system has such 
function or not, the ascription is based on the perspective taken by a 
beholder. But defenders of the mechanistic account of computation do 
not embrace the perspectivalist view: they argue that the mechanistic 
account of physical computation should avoid, if possible, any appeal to 
epistemic interest of beholders, since numerous objections against the 
possibility of an objective account of physical computation rely on the 
possibility of arbitrary ascriptions of computations to physical systems. 
Moreover, they want to account for malfunction of computational 
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systems or the failure of physical mechanisms to perform their function. 
One of the major objections against the perspectivalist view is that the 
same capacity of a physical system may count as functional and 
dysfunctional at the same time (Millikan 2002). Instead, Piccinini and 
Miłkowski have both argued for teleological accounts. While there are 
some notable differences between their accounts, they both seem to 
embrace a unified view on a function that includes technical functions of 
artifacts and teleological functions of natural computing mechanisms. 
For example, Piccinini defines the notion in the following way: 
A teleological function (generalized) is a stable contribution to a 
goal (either objective or subjective) of organisms by either a trait 
or an artifact of the organisms (Piccinini 2015, 116). 
The upshot of this definition is that there cannot be any computers 
without organisms: either as their users or as physical mechanisms 
whose goals are satisfied by the existence of such computers. Quite 
clearly, before there were organisms, there were rocks, and they were 
not implementing any functions. So far, so good. But couldn’t it be 
possible in principle that there could exist computational physical 
systems other than organisms or artifacts produced by organisms? For 
example, one could imagine naturally evolved robots that have their 
goals fulfilled thanks to computation. But Piccinini rejects this possibility 
by saying that these would count as organisms in a broader sense 
(Piccinini 2015, 113). 
The approach of Miłkowski is partially similar to the one 
proposed by Craver and Cummins but also relies on the teleological view 
defended at length by Ulrich Krohs (2004, 2007): “the functional role of 
a component is one of its causal roles, such that it contributes to the 
system behavior of the mechanism (as in the classical analytical account 
in Cummins 1975; for a mechanistic variant of this account, see Craver 
2001), but the organization of the mechanism is based on the process of 
selection of its parts as types” (Miłkowski 2013, 62). This requires a bit 
more elucidation. Krohs defends a design-based notion of function where 
design is understood as a type fixation of a complex entity. The type- 
fixed entity is defined thus: 
(COM) A complex entity is type-ﬁxed iff its components are type-
ﬁxed. 
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(TF) A component of an entity is type-ﬁxed iff it is part of the 
entity because of its type and not merely because of its properties 
(Krohs 2007, 77). 
Again, the components of rocks are not selected as types: there is no 
assembly process that generates them for the purpose of computing 
constant functions. Yet, in contrast to Piccinini, no appeal is made to the 
existence of organisms. 
It’s beyond the scope of this paper to compare both accounts in 
detail, and see how they address the main objections in the debate over 
teleological function. Still, it’s instructive to discuss shortly an alternative 
view on technical functions. For example, a sophisticated ICE theory 
(Intentional-Causal role-Evolutionist) is defended by Pieter Vermaas and 
Wybo Houkes: 
An agent a ascribes the capacity to ϕ as a function to an artefact x, 
relative to a use plan p for x and relative to an account A, iff: 
I. the agent a has the capacity belief that x has the capacity to ϕ, 
when manipulated in the execution of p, and the agent a has the 
contribution belief that if this execution of p leads successfully to 
its goals, this success is due, in part, to x’s capacity to ϕ; 
C. the agent a can justify these two beliefs on the basis of A; and 
E. the agents d who developed p have intentionally selected x for 
the capacity to ϕ and have intentionally communicated p to other 
agents u (Vermaas and Houkes 2006, 9). 
Note that this account rules out ascriptions of computational functions 
to biological brains, as they were not selected by any intelligent agent.1 
However, it can be easily used to ascribe functions to a computer running 
a Scheme interpreter or to a pair of logical gates. One can consult the 
agents who have developed the Scheme interpreter and determine that 
base-13 society is indeed wrong in assuming that ‘5’ is given in base-13 
notation (see section 1). In other words, under ICE account, semantic 
considerations may be framed in terms of the developers’ intentions. And 
                                                          
1 At least most of them, except for direct genetic modifications, such as the ones used in 
optogenetics (Deisseroth et al. 2006) 
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these considerations may constrain the hypotheses about the function of 
computational artifacts. 
A similar move is possible under Miłkowski’s account, as long as 
the type fixation process is sensitive to semantic values of computations 
performed. For example, one may analyze the compiler or interpreter of 
Scheme programming language to see whether the results of defined 
numerical functions turn out to be systematically correct and coincide 
with the BNF specification. The BNF specification, after all, was most 
probably used to design the compiler or interpreter (it makes no 
difference to this account whether it was this particular specification or 
some other). And the same can be done using Piccinini’s account: the 
goals of organisms using Scheme on their computers will be achieved if 
the Scheme interpreter or compiler is executed, so the computer may be 
ascribed a function to run Scheme programs (interpreted or compiled), 
and thus to execute any function the user might want to execute. So, 
while mechanistic accounts of function are more general, in terms of 
semantic considerations, they do not fall behind sophisticated accounts 
of technical functions.  
The upshot of this short discussion is that the gist of 
considerations cited in favor of semantic accounts of computation can be 
preserved in the mechanistic account. For example, Jerry Fodor has 
claimed that it’s characteristic for (some) mental processes to preserve 
semantic properties such as truth. In his opinion, what makes 
computational psychology so compelling is the fact that one may build a 
computer that does the same: 
if you have a device whose operations are transformations of 
symbols, and whose state changes are driven by the syntactic 
properties of the symbols that it transforms, it is possible to 
arrange things so that, in a pretty striking variety of cases, the 
device reliably transforms true input symbols into output symbols 
that are also true. I don't know of any other remotely serious 
proposal for a mechanism that would explain how the processes 
that implement psychological laws could reliably preserve truth 
(Fodor 1995, 9). 
While mechanists have pointed out that there could be computational 
processes that do not preserve the constraint of truth preservation — a 
trivial counterexample is a single NOT gate – there are plenty that do. So 
while preservation of semantic properties is not an essential property of 
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computational mechanisms, it is a property that can be partially 
explained computationally in terms of reliable processes of computation 
over vehicles that were arranged in a manner that preserves semantic 
constraints. Simply, one cannot explain truth preservation unless there 
are also appropriate syntactic processes. This is what can be explained 
computationally about representation; so even if intentionality cannot 
be reduced to computation, some regularities in intentional processes 
can be explained computationally. 
In semantic computation, the vehicles over which the 
computations are performed are bearers of semantic information. Notice 
that a vehicle cannot have semantic properties if it is not a bearer of 
structural information (data): the data needs to be well-formed to have 
semantic content. The condition of well-formedness of data is always 
satisfied for computational mechanisms according to the mechanistic 
account of physical computation. But computational mechanisms need 
not operate on meaningful data. They may as well process gibberish.  
In general, two kinds of semantic information may be 
distinguished: instructional and factual (Floridi 2010, 34). The first 
conveys the need for a specific action, and the latter states the facts. 
While it is not controversial that in programmable computers there are 
programs full of instructional information (Fresco and Wolf 2013) it is 
far from obvious that one can build computers whose symbols are 
genuinely or intrinsically meaningful in the factual sense (Harnad 1990). 
The mechanistic account of physical computation does not presuppose, 
therefore, that all computation is over meaningful data. However, it does 
not exclude the possibility of computation over meaningful data. In this, 
it clearly differs from the semantic view defended by Shagrir, and at the 
same time, it can include semantic constraints in mechanistic 
explanations. This also means that the mechanistic account is not merely 
structural: it may appeal to content-involving facts, such as the ones 
invoked by Rescorla. 
While the account of what makes well-formed data semantic goes 
beyond the scope of this paper (but see Floridi 2010; Dretske 1982; 
MacKay 1969), there are mechanistic explanations of representational 
phenomena. Mechanists presuppose that intentionality or semantic 
properties may be explained in terms of semantic information and 
teleological function, and some have already proposed accounts of 
representational or intentional mechanisms  (Miłkowski 2015; Plebe and 
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De La Cruz 2016). Representational mechanisms are an important 
proper subset of computational mechanisms. 
The assumption that a given mechanism is representational 
constrains computational hypotheses about the system; here, the 
mechanistic account follows Shagrir’s (2001) analysis. Let’s take the 
example of ambiguous circuits, CIRC1 and CIRC2. If we know how these 
circuits are supposed to work – what their representational function is, 
i.e., what kind of characteristics of entities are represented by 
computational vehicles – we can settle for one interpretation of the 
voltages in the circuits. To wit, the mechanistic account, thanks to the 
notion of the representational function of computational mechanisms, 
can make use of the considerations cited by Shagrir and Rescorla. In the 
next section, one case will be studied in detail to show how. 
3. Semantic constraints at work 
Cognitive maps are paradigmatic examples of genuine mental 
representations cited by neuroscience. The representational hypothesis, 
put forward by Edward Tolman (1948), has inspired a particularly rich 
research program (Bechtel 2016). Such maps are structured but not 
reducible to language-like media (Rescorla 2009); they are also prime 
examples of structural representations  (Cummins 1996). While there 
are multiple different mechanisms involved in the functioning of 
cognitive maps – different kinds of cells are responsible for representing 
distinct features of the environment in quite complex ways, a recent 
finding of representing future paths as trajectories to a goal will be 
analyzed here. The finding concerns a neural code discovered in the rat’s 
hippocampus. 
The rat’s hippocampus generates brief sequences encoding 
spatial trajectories strongly biased to progress from the subject’s current 
location to a known goal location. Pfeiffer and Forster (2013) were able 
to find direct evidence for the existence of future-focused navigational 
activity of place cells in a realistic two-dimensional environment. They 
have elegantly shown that it is related to sharp-wave-ripple (SWR) 
events; SWRs are irregular bursts of brief (100–200 ms) large-amplitude 
and high-frequency (140–200 Hz) neuronal activity in the hippocampus. 
In other words, there is direct evidence that place cells are involved in 
planning future routes. To find this evidence, Pfeiffer and Foster used a 
40-tetrode microdrive that permitted synchronous electrophysiological 
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activity recording from 250 place cells. Using sophisticated mathematical 
methods, they were able to decode the locations represented by this cell 
ensemble in SWRs. 
However, the finding is all the more exciting because it can be 
integrated with previous work on cognitive maps (Schmidt and Redish 
2013). This previous work is also computational. A number of computer 
simulation studies were designed to study cognitive maps and their 
possible neural encodings (see e.g. McNaughton et al. 2006; Conklin and 
Eliasmith 2005). Simulations take inspiration from experimental results 
and often go beyond available evidence, and experiments are then 
designed to test for plausible computational schemes. Neuroscientists 
understand that there are neural structures that have special 
computational roles, but that doesn’t mean that a single anatomical 
structure plays just one role; as it turns out, it may play multiple roles in 
multiple neural systems, which is evidenced in the work on the 
hippocampus (Redish 1999, xiii). The neural code used to plan future 
routes is yet another code among the ones already discovered in 
navigation computations performed by the rat. 
From the mechanistic point of view, current computational 
models, impressive as they are, remain incomplete because of the 
intrinsic complexity of the navigational subsystems and difficulties 
involved in their study. What is notable here is that Pfeiffer and Foster 
assume a representational point of view and explore the 
electrophysiological activity of neurons as related to the features of the 
external environment in the rat subject in various experimental 
conditions. In the discussed experiment, rats foraged for food distributed 
in random locations. Every day, they would start from the same home 
location, which remained constant for the day, and would change the 
next day. This way, rats could try novel routes. In other experiments, rats 
may learn the topology of the maze and then they are transferred to 
similar mazes to discover how they remember the topology (Alme et al. 
2014). In other words, what is studied is the relationship between the 
activity of the organism and its environment. Only in such a context does 
a computational model make sense; and the overarching hypothesis is 
that neural processes are involved in various representational tasks. 
The discovery of encoding requires researchers to understand 
what features of the environment could be encoded by neural events, and 
then to study (statistically) the results of electrophysiological recordings 
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as related to these features. In the study under analysis, the researchers 
have found that there are two kinds of trajectory events: ones that were 
initiated when the rat was at the Home location (‘home events’), and the 
ones initiated elsewhere (‘away events’). Interestingly, it turns out that 
the Home location was over-represented in away-events relative to other 
locations in the open field. This means that researchers need not 
presuppose that representation in the brain is absolutely veridical; it 
may be biased for some reason (one may speculate, for example, that the 
Home location is particularly important because the rat started its 
exploration there). So how can they be sure that these trajectory events 
really represent future routes? The confirmation of this representational 
hypothesis is that the rat simply takes one of the future routes 
immediately after planning it. 
The trajectory events discovered by Pfeiffer and Foster are 
consistent with the number of previous hypotheses and allow 
researchers to make them more precise by offering an experimental 
method: 
trajectory events relate to hippocampal function in multiple 
conceptual contexts: as a cognitive map in which routes to goals 
might be explored flexibly before behaviour, as an episodic 
memory system engaging in what has been termed ‘mental time 
travel’, and as a substrate for the recall of imaginary events. These 
conceptualizations reflect a continuity with earlier speculations on 
animals’ capacities for inference (Pfeiffer and Foster 2013, 78). 
In other words, understanding the context in which a given mechanism 
works helps the modelers to analyze its internal structure that is 
supposed to perform inferential computations, especially those related 
to mental time travel, route planning, and the recall of imaginary events. 
The experimental method yields semantic constraints on computational 
models of these inferential processes: plausible models should conform 
to neural encoding schemes discovered experimentally. Otherwise, 
computational models of the hippocampus might diverge from what is 
known about the behavioral functioning of the rat, and this is precisely 
what researchers want to avoid. In terms of the mechanistic approach to 
explanation, one may state it in the following way: The phenomenon to 
be explained is described as the function of place cells to represent future 
paths, and the causal explanation (currently somewhat incomplete, as 
Marcin Miłkowski 
The False Dichotomy Between Causal Realization and Semantic Computation 
[15] 
precipitating conditions of the mechanism are not clear) shows the 
orchestrated activity of place cells that contributes to the realization of 
this function. 
It needs to be noted that computational models are in general 
difficult to confirm or disconfirm experimentally; one may usually 
produce a number of different models consistent with experimental 
findings. Including more constraints allows researchers to reject at least 
some models. This way modeling is less arbitrary. In some sense, 
modelers need to practically solve the ambiguities such as the ones 
mentioned by Shagrir in his example of experimentally ambiguous 
logical gates, or by Rescorla in his example of ambiguous numerical 
encoding. They may do it by including semantic constraints in the 
specification of the explanandum phenomenon. 
To sum up, it is only natural to assume that the function of neural 
mechanisms involved in solving representational tasks is to represent. 
There is no particular reason to abstain from representational 
hypotheses, which are extremely helpful from the mechanistic 
perspective to make models explanatorily more plausible. 
4. Conclusion 
Successful cognitive modeling is a question of satisfying multiple 
constraints from multiple fields of inquiry, levels of organization, and 
theories. Semantic and ecological considerations are not just heuristics 
of discovery of mechanisms. They are constraints over the space of 
possible mechanism representations. By a constraint I understand a 
representation that shapes the boundaries of the space of plausible 
representations of mechanisms or the probability distribution over that 
space (Miłkowski 2017). The more constraints are satisfied, the more 
integrated the model of a mechanism becomes. Ideally, all constraints 
should be satisfied to produce an explanatorily plausible mechanism 
model. 
The mechanistic view on physical computation does not assume 
that all computation makes sense. There may be plenty of computation 
without any representational role. However, there are computations 
over representations, and these are extremely important for cognitive 
(neuro)science. For this reason, to remain descriptively and normatively 
adequate, the mechanistic view has to assume that representational 
constraints are important, and they can be naturally included in 
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descriptions of functions of computational / representational 
mechanisms. 
Hence, the dichotomy between the causal realization and 
semantic computation is false. Semantic computations are realized 
causally, and they can be studied mechanistically. For the mechanistic 
account of explanation, there is no reason to abstain from 
representational hypotheses in science. The proponents of the 
mechanistic account of physical computation only stress that not all 
computers operate on semantic information. But computation and 
representation do not screen off each other. 
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ABSTRACT 
THE FALSE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN CAUSAL REALIZATION AND 
SEMANTIC COMPUTATION 
In this paper, I show how semantic factors constrain the understanding 
of the computational phenomena to be explained so that they help build 
better mechanistic models. In particular, understanding what cognitive 
systems may refer to is important in building better models of cognitive 
processes. For that purpose, a recent study of some phenomena in rats 
that are capable of ‘entertaining’ future paths (Pfeiffer and Foster 2013) 
is analyzed. The case shows that the mechanistic account of physical 
computation may be complemented with semantic considerations, and 
in many cases, it actually should. 
KEYWORDS: physical computation; semantic account of computation; 
mechanistic account of computation; mechanistic explanation; causal 
realization 
 
